AI Threat Protection

Your engineering team loves AI, and the bad guys do too

Executing a sophisticated supply chain attack used to require time, resources, and a skilled team. AI has removed all three constraints. Attacks now move at machine speed, and businesses can't keep up — except the ones protected by Chainguard.

Major malware attacks on open source

A running record of the supply chain attacks targeting open source registries. Each entry below breaks down what happened, the impact, how to remediate, and why Chainguard customers were not affected.

May 14, 2026
node-ipc
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An attacker published three malicious versions of node-ipc directly to npm, injecting a credential harvester into the CommonJS entry point while leaving the ESM entry point clean. The payload fires on every require('node-ipc'), sweeps over 90 credential file patterns, and exfiltrates via DNS TXT queries to Google DNS and HTTPS POST to a typosquatted Azure domain.
Backdoored package
May 11, 2026
Mini Shai Hulud: npm & PyPI Worm
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The TeamPCP campaign that began with the SAP compromise on April 29 returned at scale. Attackers exploited pull_request_target workflow vulnerabilities to hijack @TanStack's CI/CD pipeline and push malicious lifecycle scripts into 42 @TanStack packages across 84 versions. The poisoned @TanStack packages carried valid SLSA provenance — signed by TanStack's own CI pipeline — making them indistinguishable from legitimate releases. From there, the blast radius expanded to include 400+ npm and PyPI package versions across 100+ namespaces — including @mistralai, @uipath, and @squawk. Collectively, these dependencies have 500M+ monthly downloads. The malware silently harvests CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, and GitHub tokens and includes a deadman's switch that deletes a developer's entire repository if the credential harvester's permissions are revoked. Note: This attack is different than the typosquat/brandsquat attack against TanStack from April 29, 2026.
Install-Time Script
Apr 29, 2026
SAP’s Cloud Application Programming Model Libraries
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Attackers compromised an SAP contributor's GitHub account and used it to push a modified workflow to a non-main branch, extracting an npm OIDC token to publish malicious versions without provenance. All four packages carried a weaponized preinstall hook that downloaded the Bun runtime and executed an 11MB obfuscated second-stage payload. Stolen data was exfiltrated to public GitHub repos created on the victim's own account with the description "A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared."
Install-Time Script
CG-SystemaufforderungBefehl ausführen

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